NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS: BUILDING CAPACITY Continued from page 51 personnel from their everyday roles to simulate an environment com- pletely removed from it, simulation and subsequent structured debriefs can remove obstacles to learning because the environment is novel to all participants. Allowing individual and team experimentation and fluid practice in a no-jeopardy environ- ment opens up learning in a way that may be difficult to achieve through role-specific training. Benjamin Goodheart is an aviation professional with nearly 20 years of experience in the field. His diverse career began in aviation line service and has expanded to roles in aviation safety and loss control, training, and professional flying. He has worked in and with a variety of aviation organizations, including flight training organizations, business and general aviation operators, and major airlines, and his varied experience affords him a wide variety of opportunities to practice within his passion. Benjamin is an active author and researcher focused on novel applications within aviation safety management and organizational climate and culture. He holds an undergraduate degree in Aeronautical While gaming and simulation are particularly useful for teaching and reinforcing NTS, they can be heavily reliant on outside sources for facilita- tion. For persistent improvements to reinforcing NTS, training internal evaluators on effective debriefing is another avenue for sustainable NTS proficiency. Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of NTS training and assess- ment is its important role as the catalyst to identifying system weak- nesses that, if effectively redesigned, may eliminate the need for users to rely heavily on NTS in the first place. Use of NTS in practice is heavily dependent on the context of use, and the evaluation process may flag processes, procedures, or systems that require more of the operator that might be necessary. In that case, we have an opportunity to build a more error-tolerant system while we also develop human factors skills. As sys- tems are redesigned, a critical review of the adaptations front-line person- nel must make to succeed is also possible, and the perspective gained in that process can make for better future system design. Benjamin J. Goodheart, Ph.D. In 1989, United Airlines Flight 232 experienced a failure no one had pre- pared for: a catastrophic engine failure severed the lines of all three hydrau- lic systems that allowed the crew to control the aircraft normally. Though knowledge of the aircraft systems and years of flying experience were critical in the crew’s response and handling of the event, Captain Al Haynes noted, “...the preparation that paid off for the crew was something called [Crew] Resource Management.... Up until 1980, we kind of worked on the con- cept that the captain was the authority on the aircraft. What he said, goes. And we lost a few airplanes because of that. Sometimes the captain isn’t as smart as we thought he was.” Twenty years later, another air- plane experienced another type of unplanned failure—the simultaneous loss of both engines—necessitating a glide to landing from low altitude over New York. Captain Chesley Sullenberger later commented, “What happened that day was no accident. It was the combination of literally 40 years of effort and study, thinking about these important concepts and then trying to hone my skills—both technical and human—every day on every flight, to build a team, to create a shared sense of responsibility for the outcome.” Despite being faced with novel emergencies—events none of the crew had ever imagined, let alone practiced for—the crews of United 232 and US Airways 1549 relied on NTS to make the most effective use of the techni- cal knowledge available to them, and to communicate and coordinate toward an emerging solution. That capacity for resilient adaptation is the hallmark of non-technical skills. Individuals and teams learn that there isn’t a checklist or a process for every problem; and more importantly, they learn to leverage the individual skills and resources within a system to find and trap error before technical skills are put to the ultimate test. Of course, these events are extreme examples, and countless other, more routine experiences rely on leader- ship, team skills, decision-making, and self- and situational-awareness within and outside aviation. Although human error isn’t intrinsically causal (for more, see ABJ from third quar- ter 2015), the common attribution of human factors complications to nearly 80 percent of aviation accidents should tell us something—that technical skills simply aren’t enough. To be effective, technical aptitude must be trained and matured in concert with cognitive and social skill capacities to create resilient individuals and teams, even in the face of an unpredictable world. Dr. Benjamin Goodheart is the Founder and Principal Consultant of Magpie Human Safety Systems, a global safety and organizational perfor- mance concultancy based in Colorado. Benjamin has extensive experience in aviation safety management, planning, and accident investigation. He is an ATP-rated pilot and flight instructor, and he holds a Ph.D. with a research focus on aviation safety and organizational systems. To learn more about Magpie, visit www.safetyforhumans.com 52 Aviation Business Journal | Spring 2019 NTS in Practice
